Jewish Journal

Lebanon War: Mission Accomplished

by Dan Gordon

Posted on Aug. 31, 2006 at 8:00 pm

Contrary to what is now the accepted wisdom in the media, Hezbollah, in its recent offensive against Israel, neither badly bloodied the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) nor fought it to a standstill.

In fact, the opposite is the case.

By any legitimate measure, the IDF handed a resounding military defeat to Hezbollah, and while Israel's soldiers did not cure the cancer that is Hezbollah, they did send it into remission.

From a military perspective, there can be absolutely no doubt as to the results of Hezbollah and Iran's offensive against Israel. It was a defeat. Every part of their war plan, except the manipulation of the media, failed.

Hezbollah expected and planned for a massive charge of Israeli armor into Southern Lebanon. The amounts and types of anti-tank weapons they acquired and had operationally deployed in their forward positions, as well as their secondary and tertiary bands of fortresses and strongholds through southern Lebanon, attest to this fact. They intended to do in mountainous terrain what Egypt had so effectively done in the Sinai Desert in the Yom Kippur War.

In that war, Sinai indeed became a graveyard for Israeli armor. Egypt destroyed hundreds of Israeli tanks. Whole brigades were decimated in single battles by the Egyptians' highly effective anti-tank missile ambushes. In that war, almost 3,000 Israeli soldiers were killed. That was Hezbollah's plan. It was a good one. And it failed.

Just prior to the cease-fire, Israel suffered 29 tanks hit. Of those, 25 were back in service within 24 hours. Israel suffered 117 soldiers killed in four weeks of combat. As painful as those individual losses were to their families and to the Israeli collective psyche, which views all its soldiers as their biological sons and daughters, those numbers in fact represent the fewest casualties suffered by Israel in any of its major conflicts.

In 1948, Israel suffered 6,000 killed. In 1967, in what was regarded as its most decisive victory, Israel lost almost 700 killed in six days. In 1973, Israel lost 2,700 killed, and in the first week of the first war in Lebanon, Israel suffered 176 soldiers killed.

Why then the impression of massive Israeli casualties in clear contrast to the actual numbers of those killed? It is because the Israeli army is a citizen's army. It is made up of everyone's child, everyone's brother or sister, aunt or uncle. The nation, as a whole, mourned the loss of its children quite literally, as if they were the sons and daughters of each and every family.

Were I, as an Israeli officer in the military spokesperson's unit, to have made a statement to the Israeli press about the actual lightness of Israel's casualties, I would, at the least, have been relieved of duties, if not also of rank.

Indeed, members of my unit volunteered to a man to go into Lebanon under fire to help retrieve the bodies of four fallen soldiers and make sure that reporters (who by that time were reported to be simply driving into Lebanon) could not broadcast pictures before the families were notified. We provided an additional covering force, as well, against Hezbollah, while medics and a rabbi safeguarded the sanctity of the remains of four kids, younger than my 22-year-old son. We did so not only not under orders but in violation of orders, because we were all of us fathers, as well as soldiers, and these were not only our comrades in arms but our sons. We were there to bring them home.

That is the emotion. But the numbers are different. They are the lightest casualties suffered by the IDF in all of its wars.

Military historians will spend years deciphering why exactly this was so. Was Israel's government and its general staff, by its refusal to commit large numbers of forces for the first three weeks of combat, in fact making a highly intelligent strategic choice? Possibly.

Possibly it was dumb luck or divine intervention. Either way it meant three things:

  1. Hezbollah's ambush never happened, because Israel didn't take the bait. Instead, it used air power and then a series of probing raids, primarily by infantry, to methodically, slowly identify and root out the enemy positions.

  2. It meant that those small numbers of troops deployed into Lebanon in the first weeks of fighting had to do more with less than perhaps any other Israeli fighters in any other war. Certainly in other wars, there were many individual battles in which so much was expected of and accomplished by so few. But no war comes to mind in which so few soldiers were deployed across an entire front.

    They performed brilliantly and with uncommon courage in the face of withering fire from heavily fortified and prepared positions. These were draft-age soldiers: 18- and nineteen-year-olds, commanded on the platoon and company levels by 20-somethings, none of whom had ever faced anything remotely like the combat against Hezbollah's terrorist army. In spite of what many see as the logistical and command failures of their superiors, they performed brilliantly and achieved their objectives.

  3. When the vast bulk of Israel's force was finally deployed, made up primarily of its reservists, these soldiers achieved in 48 hours what many believe they should have been given weeks to accomplish. Despite logistical failures, some times fighting without food or water, Israel's soldiers, regular army and reserves alike, handed Hezbollah a decisive military defeat.

All of Hezbollah's Siegfried Line-like system of fortresses and strongholds, their network of command and control bunkers along Israel's northern border were destroyed, abandoned or under the control of the IDF by the end of the hostilities. Hezbollah's miniterrorist state within a state south of the Litani had been dismantled.

Its terrorist capital within a capital in Beirut, its command and control center and infrastructure were in ruins. In the end, it sought and accepted a cease-fire resolution in the United Nations that provided the framework for Israel to achieve all of its stated war aims. This last point is of no minor consequence both in terms of what Israel achieved and failed to achieve in the counteroffensive it waged against Hezbollah.

I can speak to this subject with some degree of expertise, since I was one of the people tasked with putting into a simple declarative sentence what the IDF's mission was as handed down to it by Israel's democratically elected political leaders. The sentence defining the IDF's mission read as follows:

"To bring about the conditions on the ground which will enable the international community and the government of Lebanon to live up to their obligations under U.N. Resolution 1559, to end the rocket attacks against Israel's civilian population in the north and to bring about the release of Israel's kidnapped soldiers, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regeve."

That was the IDF's stated mission, and that is exactly what it did. Whether as a result of the decisions of its political leadership and general staff, or in spite of them, Israel's soldiers, sailors and airmen brought about the conditions on the ground which enabled a U.N. resolution that on the face of it, provided for the implementation of the majority of U.N. Resolution 1559, called for the extension of Lebanon's sovereignty and the deployment of its army along Israel's border for the first time in 30 years and called for a 15,000 strong U.N. force to back up the Lebanese army and help it disarm Hezbollah, as well as enforce an arms embargo on its terrorist army.

In addition, the resolution expressed the will of the entire international community, including the government of Lebanon, through the U.N. resolution, which called for the immediate and unconditional release of Israel's captive soldiers.

In short, Israel achieved its immediate objectives and now looked to the international community and the government of Lebanon to put its words into actions.

But whether Israel and the world wins the larger war remains to be seen, and that choice is largely in the hands of Lebanon and Europe.

Just as the Spanish Civil War was a preview of what European fascism had in store for the world, I believe Iran's offensive against Israel, carried out by its terrorist army operational arm, Hezbollah, was a preview of what Islamo-facsism has in store not only for the West but for the moderate regimes of the Middle East. The same regimes that, in case anyone forgot to notice, control the oil on which the West survives.

The soldiers of the IDF bought their country's and the international community's political leadership a chance to keep the Iranian- Hezbollah cancer in remission. If that opportunity is squandered, no future Israeli political leadership will dare to limit its war aims again to simply creating conditions on the ground that will enable the international community not just to protect Israel's legitimate rights and interests, but their own.

If this indeed was the equivalent of the Spanish Civil War, then the world must know that what followed was one last chance before the abyss. For the Jewish people and the State of Israel, that abyss contained the very Holocaust which Ahmadinejad both denies and vows to complete.

We will not accommodate the international community by acquiescing to our own destruction. This, however, is not just Israel's problem. We are but the Little Satan. America and the West to the Islamo-fascists are the Great Satan.

It would be a simple matter, indeed, for Iran, in flexing its muscles against America, to dispatch Hezbollah terrorists to northern Mexico. There, equipped with little more than the very same rockets used to target Haifa, Hezbollah could target Los Angeles. Now picture that scenario with even a modest nuclear payload.

It would no longer be a question of how we stop terrorists from getting into the United States. With the same rocketry they used against Israeli citizens, Iran's terrorist army would only need to get into northern Mexico in order to hit America's second largest city with a nuclear device. What then would America do? Invade Mexico?

If through appeasement the West fails to take action to prevent the conflagration which looms on the horizon, then let there be no doubt that its flames will engulf us all. For its part, this time Israel must be ready, and it must entrust its fate into no one's hands but its own.

Dan Gordon is the screenwriter of "The Hurricane," "Murder in the First," "Wyatt Earp" and "The Assignment." He served as a reserve captain in the Israel Defense Forces during the recent war.

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